Author Archives | Robert Zaller

Migrant crisis is symptomatic of a much larger problem

Sixty million people worldwide are now on the move. It is the largest migration since World War II. It reflects the reshaping of maps, particularly in the Middle East, and the populations of places that, especially in Africa, have never really had maps. It reflects, more broadly, the detritus of the great nineteenth-century empires, which fell apart in the twentieth and have left the disintegrated states and societies of the twenty-first. It’s a problem whose complexities we have barely begun to appreciate, and whose dimensions we have yet to recognize.

People have moved before; people, in fact, have always been on the move. Sixty million people left Europe in the nineteenth century, far, far more than are (as yet) now trying to enter it. But the American Midwest and the Argentine Pampas were eager to absorb them. It was a migration that matched need and opportunity, and it built new societies without destroying old ones. Poverty is, of course, social failure, and the desire or felt necessity to move is a story that begins in tragedy, however well it may or may not end. Prejudice accompanies and compounds it; the pogroms that encouraged my grandparents to come to America were the product of hatreds as virulent as any that fester today.

What, then, distinguishes our present migrations from those of the past, and why do they appear so alarming?

The modern nation-state is above all a creature of borders. Borders are born of a centralized state imposing its writ on a defined territory; on a common identity that partly reflects and partly enables such a state; and on roads, good roads that carry persons and commodities, and that can be manned by checkpoints and defended by armies. Nation-states also breed wars which typically have borders themselves at issue, and, with World War II, a great revulsion at the idea of borders set in. The United Nations was founded on the vision of a world in which borders would become anachronistic, and would ultimately be symbolic rather than real even where they still existed for auld lang syne. The phrase of the time was One World, which American patriots of a certain stripe feared would mean a bunch of foreigners making rules for us. But the impulse toward what we now prefer to call globalization was potent, and the fact that the almighty dollar would call the shots around the world helped to assuage fears. The dollar would bring democracy, and democracy would come in at the point of a bayonet where it had no friendlier passage. Meanwhile, the great postwar set of trading and currency rules set out at Bretton Woods in 1944 was meant to create a world market, and such a market implied stabilization and administration; in short, government.

The Cold War snagged this vision for awhile, but even then the global dream advanced. Western Europe created first the Common Market and then the European Union, which sought to achieve the first supranational government in the world. A common currency was deployed, a common flag was flown, and, for citizens within the Union, borders ceased to exist: travelers could cross frontiers where millions had once shed blood with no more thought than Americans do in crossing from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.

A great, silent migration accompanied this process: the migration of jobs, particularly manufacturing jobs, from one continent to another in the name of capitalist free trade. To this was added the communications revolution known as the Internet, which created a new global culture of visual and narrative simultaneity. All of this made borders, and nations themselves, increasingly irrelevant. Or so it seemed.

New borders, of course, had to be created after World War II as after World War I. These included those of new states in Africa, the Middle East and Central and East Asia, whose births were often violent and contested. Far, indeed, from vanishing, the nation-state virtually exploded in the decades after the Second World War, at least numerically, and the original fifty-state United Nations of 1945 become the nearly two hundred-member organization of today, which includes Pacific atolls on the brink of extinction from the rising sea levels of global warming. This phenomenon was not the result of any resurgence in nationalism per se, but the consequence of the collapse of the Western empires that had ruled most of Africa and much of Asia. Where ethnicities were more or less clearly defined and a cultural history shared, new nations could achieve internal coherence and make a place for themselves. Where this was not the case, as in much of Central Africa, civil war was endemic.

Unstable states—ethnically or tribally divided, economically marginal, neocolonially exploited, and with little or no experience of the niceties of parliamentary government—frequently took the political form of one-party rule, typically led by strongmen who might wield power for decades. During the Cold War, they were often subsidized by the superpower rivals, although the beneficiaries of this largesse were almost entirely corrupt elites.

In retrospect, the Cold War may be seen as a struggle between the last two remaining world empires, Russia and the United States. Their conflict, normalized after an initial period of intense confrontation, created an odd but functional bipolar arrangement in which other rivalries, real or potential, were suppressed by the single great one of the superpowers themselves. This period ended abruptly with the sudden and quite unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, which left the American imperium temporarily uncontested.

Imperial ideologists such as Francis Fukuyama welcomed a so-called end of history in the wake of the Soviet dissolution. The Western system—capitalist democracy—was now the sole model for development, and a new “one world,” midwifed by America, would now emerge.

Capitalism did indeed become a universal model; this, however, was less an innovation than a return to the old imperial regime of the West as it had developed on a worldwide basis in the nineteenth century and existed down to 1914. Democracy was a harder sell, but also a less essential one. Where freedom and dollars had competed, America had always ensured that the greenback would win.

Storm signals, however, were immediately on the horizon. A reasonably prosperous and hitherto stable state, not far off but in Europe itself, fell apart within months of the Soviet collapse. This was Yugoslavia, a six-state federation established after World War I and frequently praised as a model of multiethnic cooperation. Torn apart by civil war, it essentially vanished within months. Wars and civil wars soon flared in Africa, most notably in Rwanda, where 800,000 civilians were literally butchered to death in a few weeks and refugees spilled over into the neighboring Congo, itself riven by strife. The Cold War had certainly had its quota of bloodshed, but these new conflicts had something different about them: a whiff of anarchy. The United States faltered badly in response to both crises, and no one else was in a position to lead. Ruling the world without a sidekick was more difficult than it seemed. Yugoslavia had been held together by the superpower rivalry, and even in Central Africa competing Russian and American interests had enforced a kind of order. The task of being the world’s policeman was arduous, expensive and largely unrewarding. Americans had elected a president in 1992 from rural Arkansas who had no experience of foreign affairs and scant interest in them precisely to relieve if not to shuck the burden of empire.

American imperial interests were still pursued by the deep state behind Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but they were kicked into higher gear by the happenstance—or blowback—of 9/11. Over a ten-year period, the United States demolished three states in an imperial rampage: Afghanistan (arguably, never a state to begin with); Iraq; and Libya. The spillover in each case has been a combination of civil and proxy wars that have collectively spawned huge refugee populations and led to the even more spectacular collapse of Syria. These populations, largely penned in the Middle East and North Africa, have now begun to make their desperate way to Europe. They have been joined by more opportunistic economic migrants, although these latter are not easily distinguished from those simply fleeing horror and unending death.

This is not a temporary problem, but the beginning of what I believe will be a great south-north exodus, exacerbated not only by civil conflict but the vast impoverishment of Third World nations and the looming disasters of climate change. The present century is shaping up as, among other things, the century of the refugee.

The United States wants no part in dealing with this mess, so substantially of its own creation. One of its leading presidential aspirants has won acclaim for proposing to build a huge new border fence to deal with what is currently a largely nonexistent problem. Europe has been more conflicted about the refugee issue, and is also more prone to its direct effects. But a very visible backlash has now developed there too, and border fences have again gone up in countries that had pledged to abolish them for good. Physical borders are not, in fact, an effective way of keeping migrants out, and penal colonies, such as the one Australia has established on remote Christmas island, are no solution either, quite apart from being moral abominations.

Where, then, is the migrant crisis leading us? In all likelihood, to a more deeply divided world, and a far less humane one than even the present sorry edition. But the crisis itself is, ultimately, only an aggravated symptom of our collective failure to create a just and sustainable world. This is not merely a desideratum, but a practical necessity. We are running out of time to achieve it.

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Migrant crisis is symptomatic of a much larger problem

Sixty million people worldwide are now on the move. It is the largest migration since World War II. It reflects the reshaping of maps, particularly in the Middle East, and the populations of places that, especially in Africa, have never really had maps. It reflects, more broadly, the detritus of the great nineteenth-century empires, which fell apart in the twentieth and have left the disintegrated states and societies of the twenty-first. It’s a problem whose complexities we have barely begun to appreciate, and whose dimensions we have yet to recognize.

People have moved before; people, in fact, have always been on the move. Sixty million people left Europe in the nineteenth century, far, far more than are (as yet) now trying to enter it. But the American Midwest and the Argentine Pampas were eager to absorb them. It was a migration that matched need and opportunity, and it built new societies without destroying old ones. Poverty is, of course, social failure, and the desire or felt necessity to move is a story that begins in tragedy, however well it may or may not end. Prejudice accompanies and compounds it; the pogroms that encouraged my grandparents to come to America were the product of hatreds as virulent as any that fester today.

What, then, distinguishes our present migrations from those of the past, and why do they appear so alarming?

The modern nation-state is above all a creature of borders. Borders are born of a centralized state imposing its writ on a defined territory; on a common identity that partly reflects and partly enables such a state; and on roads, good roads that carry persons and commodities, and that can be manned by checkpoints and defended by armies. Nation-states also breed wars which typically have borders themselves at issue, and, with World War II, a great revulsion at the idea of borders set in. The United Nations was founded on the vision of a world in which borders would become anachronistic, and would ultimately be symbolic rather than real even where they still existed for auld lang syne. The phrase of the time was One World, which American patriots of a certain stripe feared would mean a bunch of foreigners making rules for us. But the impulse toward what we now prefer to call globalization was potent, and the fact that the almighty dollar would call the shots around the world helped to assuage fears. The dollar would bring democracy, and democracy would come in at the point of a bayonet where it had no friendlier passage. Meanwhile, the great postwar set of trading and currency rules set out at Bretton Woods in 1944 was meant to create a world market, and such a market implied stabilization and administration; in short, government.

The Cold War snagged this vision for awhile, but even then the global dream advanced. Western Europe created first the Common Market and then the European Union, which sought to achieve the first supranational government in the world. A common currency was deployed, a common flag was flown, and, for citizens within the Union, borders ceased to exist: travelers could cross frontiers where millions had once shed blood with no more thought than Americans do in crossing from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.

A great, silent migration accompanied this process: the migration of jobs, particularly manufacturing jobs, from one continent to another in the name of capitalist free trade. To this was added the communications revolution known as the Internet, which created a new global culture of visual and narrative simultaneity. All of this made borders, and nations themselves, increasingly irrelevant. Or so it seemed.

New borders, of course, had to be created after World War II as after World War I. These included those of new states in Africa, the Middle East and Central and East Asia, whose births were often violent and contested. Far, indeed, from vanishing, the nation-state virtually exploded in the decades after the Second World War, at least numerically, and the original fifty-state United Nations of 1945 become the nearly two hundred-member organization of today, which includes Pacific atolls on the brink of extinction from the rising sea levels of global warming. This phenomenon was not the result of any resurgence in nationalism per se, but the consequence of the collapse of the Western empires that had ruled most of Africa and much of Asia. Where ethnicities were more or less clearly defined and a cultural history shared, new nations could achieve internal coherence and make a place for themselves. Where this was not the case, as in much of Central Africa, civil war was endemic.

Unstable states—ethnically or tribally divided, economically marginal, neocolonially exploited, and with little or no experience of the niceties of parliamentary government—frequently took the political form of one-party rule, typically led by strongmen who might wield power for decades. During the Cold War, they were often subsidized by the superpower rivals, although the beneficiaries of this largesse were almost entirely corrupt elites.

In retrospect, the Cold War may be seen as a struggle between the last two remaining world empires, Russia and the United States. Their conflict, normalized after an initial period of intense confrontation, created an odd but functional bipolar arrangement in which other rivalries, real or potential, were suppressed by the single great one of the superpowers themselves. This period ended abruptly with the sudden and quite unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, which left the American imperium temporarily uncontested.

Imperial ideologists such as Francis Fukuyama welcomed a so-called end of history in the wake of the Soviet dissolution. The Western system—capitalist democracy—was now the sole model for development, and a new “one world,” midwifed by America, would now emerge.

Capitalism did indeed become a universal model; this, however, was less an innovation than a return to the old imperial regime of the West as it had developed on a worldwide basis in the nineteenth century and existed down to 1914. Democracy was a harder sell, but also a less essential one. Where freedom and dollars had competed, America had always ensured that the greenback would win.

Storm signals, however, were immediately on the horizon. A reasonably prosperous and hitherto stable state, not far off but in Europe itself, fell apart within months of the Soviet collapse. This was Yugoslavia, a six-state federation established after World War I and frequently praised as a model of multiethnic cooperation. Torn apart by civil war, it essentially vanished within months. Wars and civil wars soon flared in Africa, most notably in Rwanda, where 800,000 civilians were literally butchered to death in a few weeks and refugees spilled over into the neighboring Congo, itself riven by strife. The Cold War had certainly had its quota of bloodshed, but these new conflicts had something different about them: a whiff of anarchy. The United States faltered badly in response to both crises, and no one else was in a position to lead. Ruling the world without a sidekick was more difficult than it seemed. Yugoslavia had been held together by the superpower rivalry, and even in Central Africa competing Russian and American interests had enforced a kind of order. The task of being the world’s policeman was arduous, expensive and largely unrewarding. Americans had elected a president in 1992 from rural Arkansas who had no experience of foreign affairs and scant interest in them precisely to relieve if not to shuck the burden of empire.

American imperial interests were still pursued by the deep state behind Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but they were kicked into higher gear by the happenstance—or blowback—of 9/11. Over a ten-year period, the United States demolished three states in an imperial rampage: Afghanistan (arguably, never a state to begin with); Iraq; and Libya. The spillover in each case has been a combination of civil and proxy wars that have collectively spawned huge refugee populations and led to the even more spectacular collapse of Syria. These populations, largely penned in the Middle East and North Africa, have now begun to make their desperate way to Europe. They have been joined by more opportunistic economic migrants, although these latter are not easily distinguished from those simply fleeing horror and unending death.

This is not a temporary problem, but the beginning of what I believe will be a great south-north exodus, exacerbated not only by civil conflict but the vast impoverishment of Third World nations and the looming disasters of climate change. The present century is shaping up as, among other things, the century of the refugee.

The United States wants no part in dealing with this mess, so substantially of its own creation. One of its leading presidential aspirants has won acclaim for proposing to build a huge new border fence to deal with what is currently a largely nonexistent problem. Europe has been more conflicted about the refugee issue, and is also more prone to its direct effects. But a very visible backlash has now developed there too, and border fences have again gone up in countries that had pledged to abolish them for good. Physical borders are not, in fact, an effective way of keeping migrants out, and penal colonies, such as the one Australia has established on remote Christmas island, are no solution either, quite apart from being moral abominations.

Where, then, is the migrant crisis leading us? In all likelihood, to a more deeply divided world, and a far less humane one than even the present sorry edition. But the crisis itself is, ultimately, only an aggravated symptom of our collective failure to create a just and sustainable world. This is not merely a desideratum, but a practical necessity. We are running out of time to achieve it.

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Migrant crisis is symptomatic of a much larger problem

Sixty million people worldwide are now on the move. It is the largest migration since World War II. It reflects the reshaping of maps, particularly in the Middle East, and the populations of places that, especially in Africa, have never really had maps. It reflects, more broadly, the detritus of the great nineteenth-century empires, which fell apart in the twentieth and have left the disintegrated states and societies of the twenty-first. It’s a problem whose complexities we have barely begun to appreciate, and whose dimensions we have yet to recognize.

People have moved before; people, in fact, have always been on the move. Sixty million people left Europe in the nineteenth century, far, far more than are (as yet) now trying to enter it. But the American Midwest and the Argentine Pampas were eager to absorb them. It was a migration that matched need and opportunity, and it built new societies without destroying old ones. Poverty is, of course, social failure, and the desire or felt necessity to move is a story that begins in tragedy, however well it may or may not end. Prejudice accompanies and compounds it; the pogroms that encouraged my grandparents to come to America were the product of hatreds as virulent as any that fester today.

What, then, distinguishes our present migrations from those of the past, and why do they appear so alarming?

The modern nation-state is above all a creature of borders. Borders are born of a centralized state imposing its writ on a defined territory; on a common identity that partly reflects and partly enables such a state; and on roads, good roads that carry persons and commodities, and that can be manned by checkpoints and defended by armies. Nation-states also breed wars which typically have borders themselves at issue, and, with World War II, a great revulsion at the idea of borders set in. The United Nations was founded on the vision of a world in which borders would become anachronistic, and would ultimately be symbolic rather than real even where they still existed for auld lang syne. The phrase of the time was One World, which American patriots of a certain stripe feared would mean a bunch of foreigners making rules for us. But the impulse toward what we now prefer to call globalization was potent, and the fact that the almighty dollar would call the shots around the world helped to assuage fears. The dollar would bring democracy, and democracy would come in at the point of a bayonet where it had no friendlier passage. Meanwhile, the great postwar set of trading and currency rules set out at Bretton Woods in 1944 was meant to create a world market, and such a market implied stabilization and administration; in short, government.

The Cold War snagged this vision for awhile, but even then the global dream advanced. Western Europe created first the Common Market and then the European Union, which sought to achieve the first supranational government in the world. A common currency was deployed, a common flag was flown, and, for citizens within the Union, borders ceased to exist: travelers could cross frontiers where millions had once shed blood with no more thought than Americans do in crossing from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.

A great, silent migration accompanied this process: the migration of jobs, particularly manufacturing jobs, from one continent to another in the name of capitalist free trade. To this was added the communications revolution known as the Internet, which created a new global culture of visual and narrative simultaneity. All of this made borders, and nations themselves, increasingly irrelevant. Or so it seemed.

New borders, of course, had to be created after World War II as after World War I. These included those of new states in Africa, the Middle East and Central and East Asia, whose births were often violent and contested. Far, indeed, from vanishing, the nation-state virtually exploded in the decades after the Second World War, at least numerically, and the original fifty-state United Nations of 1945 become the nearly two hundred-member organization of today, which includes Pacific atolls on the brink of extinction from the rising sea levels of global warming. This phenomenon was not the result of any resurgence in nationalism per se, but the consequence of the collapse of the Western empires that had ruled most of Africa and much of Asia. Where ethnicities were more or less clearly defined and a cultural history shared, new nations could achieve internal coherence and make a place for themselves. Where this was not the case, as in much of Central Africa, civil war was endemic.

Unstable states—ethnically or tribally divided, economically marginal, neocolonially exploited, and with little or no experience of the niceties of parliamentary government—frequently took the political form of one-party rule, typically led by strongmen who might wield power for decades. During the Cold War, they were often subsidized by the superpower rivals, although the beneficiaries of this largesse were almost entirely corrupt elites.

In retrospect, the Cold War may be seen as a struggle between the last two remaining world empires, Russia and the United States. Their conflict, normalized after an initial period of intense confrontation, created an odd but functional bipolar arrangement in which other rivalries, real or potential, were suppressed by the single great one of the superpowers themselves. This period ended abruptly with the sudden and quite unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, which left the American imperium temporarily uncontested.

Imperial ideologists such as Francis Fukuyama welcomed a so-called end of history in the wake of the Soviet dissolution. The Western system—capitalist democracy—was now the sole model for development, and a new “one world,” midwifed by America, would now emerge.

Capitalism did indeed become a universal model; this, however, was less an innovation than a return to the old imperial regime of the West as it had developed on a worldwide basis in the nineteenth century and existed down to 1914. Democracy was a harder sell, but also a less essential one. Where freedom and dollars had competed, America had always ensured that the greenback would win.

Storm signals, however, were immediately on the horizon. A reasonably prosperous and hitherto stable state, not far off but in Europe itself, fell apart within months of the Soviet collapse. This was Yugoslavia, a six-state federation established after World War I and frequently praised as a model of multiethnic cooperation. Torn apart by civil war, it essentially vanished within months. Wars and civil wars soon flared in Africa, most notably in Rwanda, where 800,000 civilians were literally butchered to death in a few weeks and refugees spilled over into the neighboring Congo, itself riven by strife. The Cold War had certainly had its quota of bloodshed, but these new conflicts had something different about them: a whiff of anarchy. The United States faltered badly in response to both crises, and no one else was in a position to lead. Ruling the world without a sidekick was more difficult than it seemed. Yugoslavia had been held together by the superpower rivalry, and even in Central Africa competing Russian and American interests had enforced a kind of order. The task of being the world’s policeman was arduous, expensive and largely unrewarding. Americans had elected a president in 1992 from rural Arkansas who had no experience of foreign affairs and scant interest in them precisely to relieve if not to shuck the burden of empire.

American imperial interests were still pursued by the deep state behind Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but they were kicked into higher gear by the happenstance—or blowback—of 9/11. Over a ten-year period, the United States demolished three states in an imperial rampage: Afghanistan (arguably, never a state to begin with); Iraq; and Libya. The spillover in each case has been a combination of civil and proxy wars that have collectively spawned huge refugee populations and led to the even more spectacular collapse of Syria. These populations, largely penned in the Middle East and North Africa, have now begun to make their desperate way to Europe. They have been joined by more opportunistic economic migrants, although these latter are not easily distinguished from those simply fleeing horror and unending death.

This is not a temporary problem, but the beginning of what I believe will be a great south-north exodus, exacerbated not only by civil conflict but the vast impoverishment of Third World nations and the looming disasters of climate change. The present century is shaping up as, among other things, the century of the refugee.

The United States wants no part in dealing with this mess, so substantially of its own creation. One of its leading presidential aspirants has won acclaim for proposing to build a huge new border fence to deal with what is currently a largely nonexistent problem. Europe has been more conflicted about the refugee issue, and is also more prone to its direct effects. But a very visible backlash has now developed there too, and border fences have again gone up in countries that had pledged to abolish them for good. Physical borders are not, in fact, an effective way of keeping migrants out, and penal colonies, such as the one Australia has established on remote Christmas island, are no solution either, quite apart from being moral abominations.

Where, then, is the migrant crisis leading us? In all likelihood, to a more deeply divided world, and a far less humane one than even the present sorry edition. But the crisis itself is, ultimately, only an aggravated symptom of our collective failure to create a just and sustainable world. This is not merely a desideratum, but a practical necessity. We are running out of time to achieve it.

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The chapter that should have been closed a long time ago

Most Americans agree that we should have never invaded Afghanistan. Just about all Americans agree that we shouldn’t have attacked Iraq either, except for Dick Cheney and (presumably) the corporations that feasted on that country’s destruction.

There was never a good reason for going into Afghanistan, a country we’d helped to destroy and render ungovernable long before 9/11. There was never a reason at all for invading Iraq, except for the private profit of the George W. Bush clan and its business buddies.

14 years into the first disaster and 12 years into the second, we find ourselves in an endgame that will result in the elimination of our influence, if not necessarily our presence, in both countries. The Afghan government we brokered has turned to Russia, the country that invaded it before we did, to buy weapons systems and supplies. The Iraqi government we put in place has turned to our foremost regional enemy, Iran, and to Iran’s sponsor, Russia again, and is coordinating intelligence with them in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We’re on call to provide air cover for military operations designed by others. The exit sign could not be more brightly lit for us in both places, but, like a drunk weaving out of the bar at 4 a.m., we can’t seem to find the door.

Barack, it’s over here.

The difficulty of our situation in both countries has been dramatically illustrated by two incidents, one in each. In Afghanistan, the army we’d trained turned tail and ran from an important regional center, Kunduz, just as the one we’d trained in Iraq did in Mosul, that country’s second largest city, and in Fallujah, the scene of our own heaviest losses in the Iraq war. The Taliban troops who took Kunduz, with widespread popular support in the city, had no strategic intention of keeping it; like insurgents who brought off the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, the point to be made was that cities presumed safe and secure could be occupied at will. Before they left, however, American planes staged out a nighttime raid that bombarded a hospital maintained by Doctors Without Borders despite frantic pleas, incinerating patients in their beds and killing a dozen staff. 22 were reported dead, and, days later, 33 were still missing.

Shortly after, American Special Forces—which, on any given day, operate in between 70 and 90 countries—carried out a raid that allegedly “freed” 75 ISIS captives. Despite the fact that President Barack Obama had given repeated assurances that American troops would not be involved in combat operations following the expiration of our status of forces agreement with Iraq in 2011, this caper involved dozens of servicemen in a firefight that resulted in the reported death of the first American killed there in action since then. Whether this was the first or the thousandth action that put American soldiers back in harm’s way is for your president to know, and for you to guess.

What was an American plane doing bombing a hospital in a remote Afghan city? We have yet to get a straight answer. At first, the attack was attributed to Afghan forces, which had supposedly called the strike in. A day later, that story was, in the celebrated Nixonian phrase, inoperative. Gradually, it emerged that the strike had been ordered by us, the Americans, against a target clearly identified as off limits by all the rules of war.

What were we doing rescuing hostages from a battle zone in Iraq? At first, those to be rescued were described as Kurds, the last group in the Middle East willing to do some of our fighting for us. Scratch that too, though. The prisoners were subsequently identified as a (probable) mix of ISIS deserters and Baathist soldiers from the old, long-disbanded army of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein: in short, as mercenaries. The rationale for committing American troops to their rescue was then changed from liberating to interrogating them. About whom? About what?

Does anyone actually know what is going on? Does anyone know the rules of engagement in the war we supposedly left four years ago, or in the one we are still fighting after 14?

America has, officially, 9,800 troops remaining in Afghanistan, not counting our own mercenaries and special operation forces units off the books. These were to have been phased out by the end of next year. After Kunduz, Obama announced that American forces would remain in the country indefinitely. The grounds given were that the stability of Afghanistan is vital to American security.
Despite the fact that our current security perimeter extends to Mars, it is a fact that Afghanistan has never had a stable day in its history. Regrettable, but true. Just ask Alexander the Great, or any would-be pacifier since.

Iraq, thanks to our good offices, exists as a state in name only. Various Shiite factions and militias dominate the south, where Iran has established a protectorate in all but name. Sunni jihadists, notably ISIS, dominate much of the north and west. An unofficial Kurdish state occupies the northeast; it, too, is riven by internal strife. It is, however, the closest thing to a fighting ally we now have in the Middle East, which may explain why it was able to use American forces as a cat’s paw in the hostage business. But it is regarded by everyone else—Turkey, Syria, Iran and what is left of Iraq—as the most dangerous long-term threat in the region, since its goal is a greater Kurdistan that would embrace the twenty million ethnic Kurds spread out over those countries.

No wonder the Russians are looking good as a great power patron in so many places these days. Uncle Sam has stampeded through the Middle East like a bull elephant on a rampage since 9/11, leaving a trail of failed or broken states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and, if the Russians are too late to the rescue, Syria. Egypt has escaped the same fate, so far, by a hair, though a smoldering rebellion in the Sinai Peninsula continues to tie down much of its military.

By a factor of three, world opinion now regards the United States as the greatest threat to world peace. This reputation has been well earned. For a while, at least, American interests seemed to have had some definition, if not necessarily justification. When Henry Kissinger decided to sponsor a dictator or overthrow an elected government, you knew he had a reason. The Devil is always comforting in this respect. If there’s any reason for our futile mayhem nowadays, though, or any thought process behind it at all, it has yet to be explained.

Republicans keep wanting to shut down the Department of Education, and liberals want to cut the Pentagon. But I’d suggest that the Department of State, especially the one run over the past decade by Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, would be a more appropriate target. If Foggy Bottom can’t do any better than this, maybe we ought to leave the world to Putin, and, as Rand Paul suggests, take a 50-year vacation from foreign affairs. Perhaps it would clear the mind.

Meanwhile, I am tired of our destroying hospitals, or, to name two other specializations of our precision bombing, weddings and funerals. Enough’s enough. Let’s get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, now. The warlords and the ayatollahs will do just fine without us, and—to put it personally—I’ll feel just a little bit less like the Ugly American. Maybe you will, too.

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How the United States gave the Middle East to Vladimir Putin

In the early 1970s, America’s influence in the Middle East stood at its peak. Egypt, then the region’s chief political power, had just expelled Russia, leaving American predominance unquestioned. Nowhere else in the world was it similarly unrivalled.

This heady moment did not last. Three major events in the 1970s upset the equation. The major oil-producing states of the Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia, formed a powerful cartel, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, which raised energy prices sharply, producing a decade of economic distress in the West. The pro-Western Shah of Iran was violently deposed, to be replaced by a theocratic autocracy that immediately—and humiliatingly—challenged American power by seizing the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding most of its staff hostage for two years. Finally, the United States responded to a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to prop up its pro-Communist despot by arming and training Islamic zealots against it.

The first two events were disasters for American hegemony in the region, and the latter cost an American President, Jimmy Carter, his job. The last, however, appeared to issue in great success. The Russians were bogged down by resistance forces in Afghanistan, and the resulting backlash at home, combined with the general sclerosis of the Soviet regime, had led by the end of the 1980s to the loss of its empire and, shortly after, the demise of Communism itself. The Cold Warriors of the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations congratulated themselves on having prevailed at last after a nearly half-century struggle with America’s great superpower rival. An American academic, Francis Fukuyama, went so far as to proclaim “the end of history”—that is, the unqualified triumph of capitalist democracy as the world’s sole economic and political model, and what was to all practical purposes the permanent hegemony of the United States.

Iraq was at this point a close American ally under the rule of Saddam Hussein, whose rise to power it had blessed and facilitated in the 1970s, and who had done yeoman service for American interests by tying down Iran in an eight-year war in the 1980s. The U.S. lacked only one thing in the Middle East, a secure land base for its military. This was secured when Saddam was suckered into an invasion of the tiny but oil-rich and strategically vital sheikdom of Kuwait, which sat not only on the Persian Gulf but on the northern border of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis welcomed the American-led force that drove Saddam out of Kuwait in early 1991, paid many of the expenses of the war and acceded to America’s quid pro quo: an American base on its territory. A discarded Saddam was left in power as a prop against Iran, but under a sanctions regime that crippled the Iraqi economy.

America now had its base, and a measure of revenge on the Saudis, who had coughed back a little of their cartel profits in war costs and who were forced to submit to a foreign military presence, the ultimate symbol of colonialism. By this time, most of the wealth extracted by the Saudis and their clients had been recycled in the West in the form of purchase and investment, with the family of President George H. W. Bush, long connected to the oil business, a major player—dynasty to dynasty, as it were. The Bush clan and its principal retainer, Secretary of State James Baker, could congratulate themselves on a highly successful two-for-one: the long war that tied up the ambitions of revolutionary Iran, and the short one that had brought the Saudis, as it were, to heel. Egypt had become an American client through the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli peace accord brokered by Jimmy Carter that removed the threat of an Arab attack on Israel that was the last impediment to a Pax Americana in the Middle East (American support for Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War had triggered the retaliatory formation of OPEC, although cartelization was an almost certain development at some point).

The world, not merely the Middle East, was now America’s oyster, with China still preoccupied by internal politics and an all-but-prostrate post-Soviet Russia helpless before the steady colonization of its former satellites in Eastern Europe by the European Union, backed by American military power. No state actor could even remotely compete with American interests, either regionally or on a world stage. The American Century proclaimed 50 years earlier by Time Magazine’s Henry Luce was getting its second and even stronger wind. In fact, why should its imperium be limited to a hundred years? Why not an American Millennium?

Indeed, it was true that no state could challenge the U.S. Lightly armed terrorists with no known address—the blowback from the Afghan mujahideen “we’d run against Russia,” in particular a rogue Saudi princeling named Osama Bin Laden—could, however, do what no state was able to. Bomb attacks drove us out of Saudi Arabia in 1996, disabled an American warship in 1998 and on 9/11 terrorists brought down Manhattan’s World Trade Center, the citadel and symbol of American capitalism, partly wrecked the Pentagon, and nearly demolished the White House itself. It was the first attack on the continental United States since the War of 1812, and its result was to turn Americans themselves querulous and fearful, willing to lash out at any perceived opponent.

From that point on, it would be all downhill. It is Rule One that no invader ever wins a war in Afghanistan, as would-be conquerors from the time of Alexander the Great could attest, and we have been losing the longest war in our history there since 2001. The 2003 invasion of Iraq that followed it was an attempt to secure a reliable gas pump and a fresh effort to establish American ground power. Saddam Hussein’s fall and execution in 2006 lay behind the popular challenge to dictators in Egypt, Syria and Libya in the Arab Spring insurrections of 2011, which in the first case led to revolution, in the second to civil devastation, and in the third to a failed state overrun by militias and jihadists who sowed chaos in neighboring states. A Shi’ite-ruled Iraq, meanwhile, predictably allied itself with its coreligionists in Iran, while its support of Syria’s embattled ruler, Bashar al-Assad, projected Iranian power and influence as far as the Mediterranean. American troops were unceremoniously shown the door in Iraq in 2011, while a rag-tag army, Daesh or Islamic State, made itself the master of wide swaths of northern Iraq and Syria, including Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. American policy, which had flailed under George W. Bush, dithered under Barack Obama, leaving erstwhile allies and enemies alike to fight for purchase in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere with little or no reference to American interests—to the extent they were coherently expressed at all. To cap it all, the U.S. found itself running aerial interference for Iranian forces in central Iraq in 2015, while at the same time pushing for a toothless nuclear arms pact in which Tehran “agreed” to respect its own prior commitments in return for what amounted to a subvention of its terrorist sponsorships in Syria and Lebanon. Much of this money would assuredly go to supporting the embattled Assad regime in Syria, to whose overthrow the U.S. was notionally committed. The debacle of American policy was complete. Perhaps no great empire in world history, undefeated in battle and undistracted at home, has ever had a worse decade and a half.

It is into this power vacuum that Russia has stepped in Syria and Iraq. Unlike the U.S., Russia knows exactly what it wants in the Middle East: support for its client, Assad, who leases it its only Mediterranean bases; partnership with Iran, with which it hopes to cultivate commercial and military ties; and tightened control over the former Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. These goals are clear, forthright, and visible to all; they are also achievable. And Russian President Vladimir Putin has set out to achieve them.

Two years ago, Putin bailed the U.S. out when Barack Obama was forced to walk back from his threat to bomb Syria over its use of chemical weapons; this will doubtless be seen as the moment when Russia took the initiative in the Levant from America, and set the stage for its own intervention. As Putin spared Obama the full consequences of perhaps the most humiliating diplomatic defeat ever suffered by an American president, he now projects Russia as the only power able to rescue Europe from its current flood of Syrian refugees. Perhaps he can and perhaps he can’t; but, right now, he is the only player in town.
Putin didn’t steal our lunch. We handed it to him.

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Compliance, coercion and contract

“You’re guilty.” That’s what Drexel University says to its entire work staff in the so-called compliance videos we are compelled to submit to qualify for the raise that just might…some day…finally arrive. Or, for that matter, to remain employed at all.
Prove that you’re innocent.

The presumption that one is guilty, or may be guilty, or may at some future, unspecified time become guilty, is the premise of all authoritarian regimes. Regular proof of innocence is consequently required.

In Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, or in today’s North Korea, you would or will be called on to demonstrate your absence of subversive intent by public displays of loyalty. At Drexel, and of course elsewhere in the beleaguered citadels of academia, you demonstrate that you are not a cheater, not a pedophile, and not in general a lousy guy to be around, by watching compulsory videos pitched to the intellect of a three-year-old, and punctuated by “test” questions that are, in reality, a pledge, electronically recorded, to conform your social and professional conduct to the rules implied (but not directly stated) in a variety of scenarios.

Where the rules of “do’s and don’ts” are clearly spelled out and you have no say in what they are and no choice but to obey them, you are living in an authoritarian world.

Where the line between permissible and impermissible conduct is only implied or suggested by example, you are living in a world in which there are no rules at all, and there is simply perpetual surveillance, including self-surveillance, until you tire of it and turn yourself in: guilty as not charged. That’s when you know you’re living in a totalitarian world.

It’s the world that Drexel’s administration has set up for you to receive a paycheck.

Let me state the obvious: universities have the right to expect civil and courteous conduct from those who make up the academic community. Standards of such conduct may evolve over time, and it is sometimes useful to codify them, with the participation and consent of those affected. It is reasonable to ask that people who attend and work at the university be generally familiar with them, and it may be useful to have certain personnel, such as campus police, or get more specific training. As a principle, such rules should be as simple, clear and as few as possible. Their purpose should never be to regulate conduct, but only to support an atmosphere in which the free and unimpeded flow of ideas can take place, which is the point of having a university in the first place.

Let me emphasize that point: universities are places that ought to promote unfettered intellectual freedom; they are, in fact, laboratories of freedom that should serve as a general social model. Whatever serves intellectual freedom, including democratic process, should be encouraged; whatever chills or restrains it should be removed. Mandatory compliance tests are completely incompatible with academic freedom on every level, and insulting to every member of the Drexel community. Insofar as they modify contracts, they may well be illegal as well.

Let me address that last issue. When compliance with sexual harassment tests was mandated, the initial penalty for failing to complete them was denial of merit pay increases. The second penalty was employment termination.

Taking tests is not part of my job specification at Drexel; I give them. My job performance is evaluated in terms of teaching, scholarship and service both to the University and the wider community. No other criterion legitimately applies. If I’ve done my job, I’ve earned a raise—earned, not merely deserved it. Regular raises are, at Drexel as elsewhere, an understood part of job compensation itself. Placing arbitrary conditions on getting the raise one’s performance entitles one to is, in effect, rewriting the job contract itself. If I can be compelled to sit through and respond to a video predicated on the assumption that I don’t know my job or how to conduct myself while doing it, then why shouldn’t the University be able to require me to wash dishes or scrub floors to qualify for a raise—or to stay employed at all?

This isn’t a far stretch. Many employees, and certainly faculty, know that their workload has been increased in various ways, of course without corresponding compensation. Committee work, the bane of faculty existence, has increased exponentially as administrators offload more and more of the work they’re paid to do on faculty shoulders (but none of the substantive decision-making, which administrators keep strictly to themselves). Taking compliance tests is, among other things, an additional workload obligation, which, since it has nothing to do with productive labor, not only consumes thousands of hours of staff time but requires make-up work to accomplish the real tasks that have been shoved out of the way.

Wasted time, of course, isn’t the most serious issue involved here: it’s not only the demeaning and infantile nature of the material one is required to sit through and respond to, but the work environment of conformity and fear it is designed to create. The compliance videos presuppose a world of workplace harassment, boorish advances and sociopathic predators—supervisors abusing and intimidating staff members, faculty glomming on students—that demand constant monitoring by a conscripted Thought Police and prompt reporting, of course, to the appropriate authorities. The “correct” answer to just about every question the videos demand response to is that your obligation is to turn in any and everybody whose behavior may appear to deviate a scintilla from some presumptive norm. It’s the McCarthyite mentality of the “If you see something, say something” videos and placards that blanket all transportation centers now, and that gives you one and only one option: to snitch.

The damage this does can’t be overstated. A university should be a place of civility and collaborative endeavor, but also one of uncensored expression and exchange. You should expect an open forum for your ideas, but also rigorous questioning and challenge. You should be prepared to offer the same forum to others, even (or, rather, especially) when your most cherished convictions and ideals are contested. Academic disputation isn’t a parlor game; it’s the inquest of knowledge, and knowledge isn’t born without struggle and sometimes strife. There’s no way to learn something new without discarding something old, and the process can be painful as well as exhilarating. It also can and should be civil; indeed, incivility has no place in serious discussion because it detracts from the business at hand. Students must expect to be challenged and even shocked, too, just as faculty are, and encouraged to explore and challenge for themselves. It’s a world that’s the antithesis of the snitch. It’s a world that has no place for policing of any kind, and where what should be presupposed is not superiors abusing subordinates but the natural egalitarianism of free minds.

What is most intolerable, then, is not the ludicrous scenarios depicted in the compliance videos, but the idea that any of us should be subjected to them. That they are enforced by the threat of contractual violation only adds injury to insult.
If there’s any word that has no place to begin with in a university, after all, it’s “compliance.”

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Philadelphia: the almost, not quite world-class city

A true confession: as a transplanted New Yorker, I had never set foot in Philadelphia until I was invited to interview for the job of head of the Department of History and Politics. After a long professional detour in Miami, however, the idea of a Northeastern city was irresistibly attractive to me. I could wear a sweater; I could attend a professional concert; I could visit an actual museum. Philadelphia offered these opportunities, plus a relative proximity to my hometown.

I knew certain things about the city: it was the site of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutional Convention; it had a very good orchestra; it was the home of cheesesteaks. I found other attractions, too, once I arrived, as well as certain drawbacks. Philadelphia had recently become the first city in American history to bomb its own citizens, and then to imprison not the perpetrators but the sole adult survivor of the attack. It had attractive commercial and residential areas, but also vast tracts of poverty and abandonment that reminded one of a bombed-out city. This, though, pretty much comes with the territory with any American city. It was Europe that got half-destroyed in World War II—Leningrad, Warsaw, London and Berlin. But it’s America, these days, that looks it.

Philadelphia’s most insidious problem, however, has always been its inferiority complex. It was once the first city in America, its first national capital and, at the time of the American Revolution, the largest English-speaking city in the world outside London. New York shot past it in the nineteenth century, partly because of its growth as a financial and commercial hub, and partly from its location as the destination site of Old World immigration. Philadelphia’s economic base was more in manufacturing and in its proximity to the coal and oil fields of Pennsylvania. But it is no longer a great workshop, and its prosperity and population both waned in the latter twentieth century. It was a city in economic decline when I reached it, and this trend, while partly arrested, has not been reversed. The old wealth settled in the suburbs, and to a certain extent Philadelphia was irrelevant to it. This, too, was a fairly familiar urban story. American cities, especially since the great African-American migration from the South after the Civil War, have become warehouses for the poor.

You could say much the same of Boston or Washington that you could of Philadelphia. But Washington is the national capital, and its cachet rests with that, while Boston is the capital of New England, still a region (not to say a religion) unto itself. Philadelphia is a stop on the Northeast Corridor line. It took last May’s horrific train derailment to remind a lot of people that it was still there.

As a result, the city fathers are always talking up making Philadelphia a “world-class city,” a “destination city” and the like. A few years ago, they tried to sell the poor town as an American Paris. Sorry, but I’ve been to Paris. No sale.

Nowhere was the Great Inferiority Complex more palpably on display than in the late struggle over the Barnes Foundation. Nestled just over the city line in suburban Merion, the Foundation, the brainchild of a self-made millionaire, Albert C. Barnes, and America’s foremost philosopher, John Dewey, was home to one of the world’s largest private collections of art, and assuredly its best. The Barnes and its educational program had functioned for seventy years when a consortium of Philadelphia business, “charitable,” and political interests, having milked its endowment dry, succeeded in moving the collection downtown into a museum as ugly in design as in purpose: to commercialize what had been designed as a purely philanthropic venture, free of tuition or other charge to the public in perpetuity. City fathers crowed over their coup, for the Barnes, now situated on the Ben Franklin Parkway instead of the wilds of Merion five miles away, would surely make Philadelphia world-class. What it demonstrated, certainly to me, was the ingrained provinciality of a city that thinks the way to deck itself out is with the stolen goods of its neighbor. (The world took notice, too; I received letters from as far away as Australia, vowing never to set foot in Philly because of the Barnes heist.)

Now, it seems, the city is on the verge of becoming world-class yet again because of the visit of Pope Francis. If a papal blessing could do the trick, we’d be in luck this time, because Francis dispenses his blessings in bunches. Alas—or, depending on your point of view, thankfully—he’ll only be here for a couple of days, so Philadelphia won’t become Rome any more than it did Paris. It’s been enough, though, to provide nonstop news, most of it about how to cope with the virtual lockdown of center city while His Holiness graces us. Our paper of record, the Inquirer, seems to have turned itself into an English-language version of L’Osservatore Romano for the duration, including tips on how to train for a five-mile hike to see the Pope celebrate Mass. But then, it’s not every day you get a chance to become world-class—even if it’s only for a day.

Philadelphia really does have a history as the birthplace of the world’s first modern democracy, and as a place with a rich and diverse life. It just might be that it sells itself short by trying to sell itself too hard. Its elites have certainly failed it of late, not to say embarrassed it. It’s not too late, though, to shed delusions of grandeur it will never sustain. It could make a beginning by coming to terms with its vexed racial history, especially the MOVE bombing. And it could return the Barnes where it belongs, back in Merion. Dial me when it does.

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Charleston: a reflection of race relations

The terrible mass shooting of black elders at what is perhaps America’s preeminent African-American church sends off too many messages at once about our racially charged culture to make for any decent response. The numbness and horror will have to be dealt with first, and the issues parsed one by one. What is clear is that we have entered a period of racial violence such as we haven’t seen since the ’60s. We are sitting on a national tinderbox.

At this point, public reaction has crystallized around the Confederate battle flag that flies on the grounds of South Carolina’s state capitol in Columbia, and that until about 15 years ago flew from the statehouse itself.

But, say, didn’t the Confederacy lose the Civil War 150 years ago? Don’t rebel flags come down with military surrender?

The answer is yes, and down they did come — until 1961, the centenary of the war, when South Carolina legislators put the battle flag back up as a gesture of defiance to the federal government and the emerging challenge to Jim Crow segregation across the South.

I know what Abraham Lincoln would have done if that had happened on his watch. I’m pretty sure what would have happened if President Dwight Eisenhower, who knew a thing or two about taking down enemy flags, had still been president in 1961. But Jack and Robert Kennedy decided to look the other way, not yet having the modicum of backbone finally instilled in them by Martin Luther King. Lyndon Johnson chose to pick his fight with the Viet Cong, and then came the great backlash under Nixon, as the South went Republican and the Grand Old Party struck its long and continuing bargain with the devil in exchange for its votes. The flag flew.

Does it matter that it still does? Of course it does. When the national and state flags went down to half-mast over the shootings at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Confederate flag flew triumphantly high alongside South Carolina’s capitol. Yes, indeed, the South had risen again, in all the swelling pride of an unrepentant slave state affirming, for all to see, the glory of its “heritage”: hatred, bigotry, human exploitation, as well as the nullification of black dignity and life.

Do we really want the South to win the Civil War after all? Sounds a lot like it.

If I were Barack Obama, I’d have sent troops to Columbia to pull that flag down, the way Eisenhower sent his marshals into Little Rock to enforce the Supreme Court’s school desegregation order in 1957. If that didn’t do the trick, I would have sent William Tecumseh Sherman back to South Carolina to do the job he did on it in 1864 all over again. And if South Carolina wanted to secede from the Union again, I’d be the first to tow it out to sea. I’ve spent enough of my life sharing my citizenship with people who think that slavery was and probably still is God’s ordinance.

I’m not Barack Obama, of course, and so I didn’t pull that flag down. I didn’t come down to Charleston to commiserate with the survivors of Dylann Roof’s massacre and to lead a grand march affirming the values that hundreds of thousands of Americans gave their lives for. I didn’t even send Joe Biden, my designated mourner. I didn’t do anything but mumble a few chill and distant words about “violence,” and have an aide reference some remarks I made eight years ago about Confederate flags belonging in museums.

If the presidency is, at least in a symbolic sense, the moral center of the country, then that center is vacant. And that has really caught up with us now.

When Trayvon Martin was killed, Obama ventured to say that if his children had been male, they would probably have looked like him. It was a vaguely empathetic remark and it might have passed as personal. Of course, Martin’s slaying was a local jurisdictional matter, and the federal government had no say in it — even though the Justice Department would, without excuse, usurp Massachusetts’ jurisdiction in the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev terrorist trial.

Trayvon Martin’s case was an unheeded wake-up call. Whatever its legal disposition, it needed to begin an urgent conversation on race and violence against young black men by police and auxiliary forces, many of them armed to the nines by Obama’s Pentagon.

Obama made no effort to lead such a conversation. He has given no national speech as killing has succeeded killing. He’s evidently got more important things to do, like ramming a corporate trade deal down our throats or gratifying the ayatollahs in Tehran, or maybe just playing golf. On what has become the defining issue of his presidency, though — the one you knew all along was coming, sooner or later — he has been strictly AWOL. I can’t think of a more pathetic moral abdication, or one that will cost this country more.

Meanwhile, what may not be the least of the damages inflicted by the Emanuel AME Church shootings is that to our criminal law itself. I’ve seen numerous calls, as I’m sure you have, for Roof to be charged with “hate crimes” as well as multiple homicides, or under federal domestic terrorism statutes. This is a whole class of specious justice that has sprung up in recent decades, particularly in the wake of 9/11.

The concept of a hate crime is legally and morally incoherent. Hate is not itself a crime, any more than any other thought or sentiment that may seem repugnant, subversive, or otherwise unconducive to right thinking and good public order. Roof’s crime was not to hate African-Americans, but to kill them, and that he killed them with hateful intent adds nothing but circumstance to acts that in and of themselves carry the maximum penalty of the law. We may wish to consider intent in weighing culpability, in assessing felonious penalty and in weighing mercy.

But to consider state of mind as a separately felonious act, an aspect of felony itself, is to criminalize thought. The whole burden of the Anglo-American legal tradition is that a felony is a legally punishable act, that without the act no crime is committed, and that the punishment cannot exceed the maximum penalty stipulated for the act. Only tyrannies want to go further than that.

“Domestic terrorism” is a similarly slippery concept. Although South Carolina’s governor, Nikki Haley, has already tried, convicted and sentenced Roof (to death) — they do do things differently in the South, don’t they? I prefer to wait for the trial. One thing, though, that seems reasonably clear at this point is that Roof acted alone, on his own initiative, and without co-conspirators of any kind.

A terrorist, to my understanding, is one who acts feloniously with or on behalf of others in pursuit of a shared goal founded in intimidation or violence. Roof had no sponsors or accomplices of any kind, and if he came to his views by imbibing the atmosphere of hatred so prevalent in his environment, that will not inculpate any others not directly connected with him or directly inciting his behavior.

He needs (presuming his sanity) to be tried on a strictly legal basis, on nine individual counts of homicide, no more and no less. The moral reflection that will hopefully grow out of it — with or without Barack Obama — is ours to make.

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Congratulations class of 2015, the class of debt

You, Class of 2015, are the hope of the future.  We, your teachers and elders, bequeath to you the Islamic State, the boat people who float the world’s oceans and global warming. But you haven’t seen the real kicker yet.

You are about to proudly assume your station as the world’s largest debtor class. With more than a trillion dollars of loans outstanding, no one else even
comes close.

You’ve got a big beef coming. No dirtier trick has ever been played on anyone.   

Education, you see, should come for free.

I paid nothing for my public school education, of course. I paid nothing, either, at the public college I attended after. Nor, thanks to postgraduate fellowships, did I ever pay a penny in tuition at the private universities I went to after that. My stipends paid my other expenses. I never accrued a penny of debt for my education, and it never occurred to me that I would or should. And there was nothing particularly unusual about my case. Back then, education was viewed as society’s social investment in its own future. The idea that students would graduate tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt, a burden they would spend a good part of their working lives paying off, would have been incomprehensible.

Of course, fewer students went to school then, and minorities often found their access to education blocked. It wasn’t a golden age, just a simpler one. No one had figured out how to turn education into a racket.

As the demand for access to college grew — a function of the new “knowledge” economy that required higher and higher levels of skill and training, or at least was supposed to — governments began to subsidize education through such devices as Pell grants. They never kept pace with need, but at least they represented an acknowledgment that acquiring an education was not something that should cost you a good part of
your future.

Those days aren’t with us anymore. Starting in the 1970s, the grant model was slowly, and then more swiftly, replaced by the loan one. The federal government became the largest source of such loans — 85 percent of the total market, with a few big banks like J. P. Morgan and Wells Fargo covering most of the rest. Meanwhile, the costs of education steadily outpaced general inflation, decade after decade. There were various reasons for this, including academic bureaucratization, plant expansion and a growing interface with the military-industrial complex. The one thing that hasn’t added to your tuition bill is faculty salaries, the sole area in which academic administrators have found plentiful cost savings.

The big loan provider was Sallie Mae, which is technically the SLM Corporation . It went private in 2004 but its funder is still federal taxation. Basically, then, it is a protected middleman — sort of like the so-called health care industry, which mulcts medicare. But the Department of Education is still big-time in this business. It sets up loans at, typically, 6.8 percent these days, on money that it can access at a preferred current rate of 2.52 percent. The difference, so far, is over $100
billion in profit.

That’s right, class. The government isn’t subsidizing your education. It isn’t providing it at something like cost. It is operating the education market as a business franchise, and it’s making a killing off you. How’s that for investing in the next generation?

Shall I repeat this?  Your government is
scamming you.

By the early 2000s, student defaults had already reached epidemic proportions. Accordingly, the government tightened bankruptcy regulations — for you, of course, not General Motors. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which meant, like most legislation, precisely the opposite of its title, made it impossible for student borrowers to file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcies except under the most exigent circumstances. This was followed by the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, which, you guessed it, raised penalties further for you. Student loans are now subject to wage garnishments at 15 percent for up to 25 years.

And you thought the only thing the Bush administration was up to was fighting crazy wars that turned half the world against us.

The good news is that, unlike the housing bubble, student loans are essentially in the hands of a single giant lender, which, among other things, prints money. The government could forgive all student indebtedness if it chose, or rather if one branch of it, the Congress, ordered another branch, the Executive, to do so. Granted, a trillion dollars is a lot of money. But, of course, it is only due in protracted installments, and there are plenty of cost-savings — say, on current and future “wars of choice.” Or, maybe the IRS could start collecting taxes on giant corporations it actually subsidizes instead. I don’t know — just a few wild ideas like that.

I know a lot of people don’t want the government practicing socialism. That’s not what it’s doing, though. It’s practicing capitalism on a captive market of the young — namely, you.

Debt slavery is only the beginning of the story, though. To pay off debt, you need income; to generate income, you need a job. And that is what the American economy — again with the blessings of your government, which alone among the industrialized nations of the world lacks a jobs policy, but exports work instead — is increasingly failing to provide. The story of the next generation, in other words your own, will be the replacement of specialized white-collar labor by computers and the machines they will operate. Managerial functions, too, will disappear, so bureaucrats will need to watch their hides. This process is already well underway. But, with a looming jobs deficit on the horizon — a permanent deficit, not one caused by blips in the economy like depressions — how are you supposed to pay off that huge student loan of yours?

If this doesn’t seem to compute, it’s because it doesn’t in fact, except for that small elite (formerly called the ruling class) in a position, thus far, to game the system on its own behalf. Let’s throw in a few randomizing factors like climate catastrophe and resource wars, and the future really begins to look interesting.

I guess the good news is that some countries don’t regard the next generation as something to be exploited from the cradle and actually provide public education for free through the university level. That doesn’t solve the climate problem, of course, or the coming jobs crisis. But it is hopeful, at least, that some societies don’t regard their young as a source of protein yet.

As Susanne Soederberg points out, there are some nascent groups, like the Debt Collective, which have begun to resist the student loan stranglehold. Mass resistance is always hard to mobilize, but students have led many worthy protest movements in the past. One in their own interest is by now long overdue.     

It’s a good way to start your future.

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Faculty senate should not exist if it fails to meet faculty needs

At the Drexel University assembly meeting May 27, which unfortunately I was not able to attend, the faculty senate will pat itself on the back for a job well done as usual in representing the interests of the Drexel administration at the expense of the faculty. It will also take note of new charter language affirming the principle of faculty governance, thereby pinning a medal on a corpse.

Let’s sum up the recent achievements of the senate.

Upon retirement, Drexel faculty typically received a lump sum payment of a year’s salary, which went at least a little way toward compensating them for what the University administration now admits was an inadequate retirement program. I say “typically,” because there was no settled retirement policy or benefit, a circumstance that forced each faculty member into an individual negotiating position without any formal rules or institutionally recognized rights. That, of course, is precisely the situation employers prefer to have their workers in. Very few universities don’t have at least some kind of retirement policy. We are proudly on that list.

Despite the absence of an official policy, a year’s salary was nonetheless the typical retirement payout, and prospective retirees knew of this through the grapevine. Less well known was that more generous packages of up to two years’ salary were also available, depending on the savvy of the faculty member and the degree of interest in “recapturing” his or her line in the preferred lingo of administration-speak, as if it were an escaped zoo animal on the loose. Frequently, the recaptured line was itself designated for retirement, as tenured faculty members were replaced by so-called “teaching” ones. (I put that term in quotes, because teaching faculty have become increasingly subject to pressure for publication and service despite their heavy workloads and low compensation.)

A couple of years ago, the administration decided to rationalize the payout package (not, heaven forbid, institute an actual retirement policy) by setting a fixed sum for it. It would henceforth be a half-year’s salary equivalent, not a full year’s. When I queried this point, I was told that a full year’s payout had never been the norm. Since, of course, the payments were all “confidential,” there would have been no way of directly challenging this statement. I have it on good authority nonetheless, from a former colleague who served in administrative positions and who informally counseled potential retirees for years, that a full year’s payout was indeed the norm.

I raised this matter at a senate meeting and told the administrative representative present that he was apparently trying to encourage me to work till 90. “We’d love to have you, Robert,” was his reply.

It’s a deal, then. Of course, I’m tenured, so it’s a little harder to show me the exit. Not so for teaching faculty — one of whom, curiously, is the current chair of the senate — who work at pleasure, enjoy no such luxury as academic freedom and are hardly in a position to obtain or protect it for others.

Once embarked on reforming retirement, the administration next attacked the matter of university contributions to the retirement plan. I say “attacked,” I think, advisedly. My own plan, as I can tell, is unaffected (although I am still awaiting the formal text of the plan, promised to me in December and not as yet delivered). But junior faculty are disastrously affected and can be required to contribute up to 85 percent of their wages to achieve the benefit level the administration is supposedly aiming for. Sorry, folks, that isn’t a benefit. It’s essentially a self-funded plan that you can set up for yourself.

How did the senate deal with that curveball? Like Ryan Howard taking a called third strike. They never took the bat off their shoulder. Come to think of it, they weren’t even in the ballpark.

So, just who is representing the faculty of Drexel University?

No one at all.

To finish our tale: As faculty and staff alike will have noticed, new pay contracts, which in the course of my time at Drexel have been rotated a full year forward under various pretexts and excuses, have been pushed forward from the start of the academic year in September to the beginning of the calendar year in January. Faculty members were not notified of this, and were simply left to wonder where their annual “evaluations” (another sour joke, in these days of 2 percent raises or less) had gone. Belatedly, the treasurer sent out a singularly unenlightening email with the news. The senate, needless to say, had no comment at all, just at it had nothing to say about the retirement swindles or, come to think of it, any other matter.

And, if you haven’t heard the news, we’ve just hired a new provost who never deigned to introduce himself to the general faculty, or even send it an email.

As they say, you get the government you deserve.

I used to be a staunch supporter of faculty senates. I even led one at a former institution. I personally negotiated annual raises, benefits and conditions of employment. I saw the full draft university budget every year, and my colleagues and I saw to it that it reflected academic priorities.

Even had I not found these terms satisfactory — and eternal vigilance, as is usually the case, was the price of freedom — the Supreme Court, in its usual wisdom, had declared faculty at private institutions ineligible to form unions. It was senates or nothing.

In Drexel’s case, unfortunately, it was a senate and less than nothing: the pretense of something that never actually existed.

Recently, however, the courts have begun to shift ground on the issue of faculty representation. They’ve noticed the distinction between serfs and “supervisors” and better late than never.

Unions haven’t been doing so well lately either. But faculty, or at least tenured faculty, have notable advantages over other kinds of personnel. They can’t be fired or railroaded out like fast-food workers. Some of them at Drexel are lawyers, accountants and economists. Even without special expertise, they tend to be brighter than average. And I think that, put to a suitable test case, unionization might very well pass legal muster now.

Some public institutions, like Temple University, have both a senate and a union. The former is a vestigial organ, like your appendix, but it does no harm. The long-time leader of Temple’s union was highly committed and capable. So is his successor, a good friend of mine whom I’m sure would be willing to share his expertise.

I would retire Drexel’s senate at once, however, with whatever thanks are due for a job completely undone. I wouldn’t wait on a union, either. Nothing at all is better than a nothing that pretends to be something.

A burst appendix can actually be fatal.

 

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