The Full Extent: The rise of the European far-right with Selen Campion

Transcript

Kaeden Thomas: Welcome to the Full Extend Podcast. My name is Kaeden Thomas, and here I’m joined with Selene Campion. We are going to be talking about the rise and surge of far-right politics within Europe. Could you give me, Celine, just a brief overview of your background and how it could pertain to this issue?

Selene Campion: Sure. Thanks so much for having me. So I’m an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science here at the U, and my work is mostly focused on European politics. So I do research on domestic European politics across mostly Western Europe, looking at local government and do work on party politics. So looking at how political parties have changed and evolved over time. A lot of my research also intersects with public policy. So I’m really interested in the policy outcomes of political change.

Kaeden Thomas: Okay, thank you. Let’s sort of take a step back. Could you explain just sort of briefly what these parties are, what they look like, what do they represent, and is there a ton of unity between these parties? Because I think we group them all under, you know, the far right, far conservative. Is that is that a is that sort of a fair grouping, or are all of these kind of distinct in their own way?

Selene Campion: Yeah. So I think of far-right parties kind of as an umbrella term, but doesn’t necessarily designate a single unified movement. So I try not to kind of collapse them all into one category, but that being said, they do have kind of commonalities that are shared between them. So when we think about radical right parties specifically, they tend to use elections and representation to advocate for similar political outcomes. So they usually tend to be quite nationalistic. They usually want to restrict immigration, and they have what we would consider to be quite a majoritarian view of democracy. So less focused on minority rights and more what they consider to be the majority. We can also kind of, along with radical right parties, we also have what we call extreme right movements. So those aren’t necessarily political parties. They start off as social movements. But so if we think about the example of that, it would be Golden Dawn in Greece, which started out as a very right-wing political movement that was very openly anti-democratic, embraced authoritarianism, embraced violence, neo-Nazi tendencies, and they ended up gaining political power. So we can think about movements turning into parties, and then what those parties do once they come into office. I think the other thing to note is often these parties are called populist radical right parties because what they share across all the national variation is, or usually a commitment to some type of populism, and so by populism I think about kind of the people versus the corrupt elite. Now, who the people are and who the elite are can change based on national context, but what they see themselves as is a representative of the people and understanding the people to be quite broad.

Kaeden Thomas: So thanks for that explanation. What are some of the causes for this recent rise in popularity?

Selene Campion: Yeah, definitely. I think their popularity certainly has increased. So I think it’s helpful to think about their rise in popularity kind of as an accumulation of pressure rather than as a single response to like a single issue. So for example, if we take the economy, which is often proposed as the leading cause of the rise of the radical right in recent years, a lot of these parties are responding to broader macroeconomic issues like high housing costs, housing shortages, economic insecurity, increased levels of economic precarity and unemployment, and kind of what they want is a response by national governments, by the current governments in power, to remedy these economic insecurities. But usually, what their remedies are. Is some type of nationalist policy. So this is where we see kind of an overlap between the causes, like economic instability and migration. So migration is often proposed alongside economic inequality as one of the leading causes or reasons for the rise in popularity of the far right, but this goes hand in hand with an economic explanation. So, radical right parties might say we have really high levels of unemployment, we don’t have enough jobs, and immigrants are taking our jobs. And so the solution is to reduce immigration, to close national borders. So the National Rally, which is the far-right party in France, has for many years kind of promoted a domestic kind of protection for natives, what they see as French natives, and that French natives should get preference in social housing or public housing. They should get certain welfare benefits that are not offered to migrants or immigrants, with the idea that this is kind of a protectionist policy, so the economic and the migration explanations I think often go hand in hand. I was just going to mention kind of the role maybe more recently of recent military buildups and security reasons, which I think has become more of has come more to the fore in terms of what voters think about and care about. So, with the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, we see that radical right parties have often taken a stand, not uniformly, but a stand against maybe overwhelming support for Ukraine. So, for example, example Viktor Órban, up until his recent defeat, was very much in support of of Russia, and wanted to kind of decrease aid and support to Ukraine. Then we also see someone like Georgia Maloney, the leader in Italy right now, who is part of a far right party, leading a far right party, but she tends to be more in support of European cooperation against Russia. So again, it kind of speaks to they might fall under this broader umbrella, but they each have their own domestic agendas.

Kaeden Thomas: I guess an additional question to that is: Are Trump’s isolationist policies from, you know, aiding, giving military backup to Europe is that also kind of adding to this pressure cooker where European states feel like they have to have the agency to you know, support their military and build that up rather than, you know, stuff that would be maybe more left-leaning policy.

Selene Campion
Yes, although I would say that the sentiment across most domestic governments in Europe or Western Europe particularly, whether or not they’re far right tends to be an acknowledgement that in the wake of America first, Trump’s America First rhetoric and policies, we need to work to develop our own security to protect ourselves. So this isn’t necessarily an issue that is solely claimed by the far right. I think the Macron government, for example, right now in France, has been very open that France needs to take a greater leadership role in defending against what’s going on in Ukraine and also just European security more generally. That being said, I think Trump’s rhetoric, so his isolationist rhetoric, and how he talks to voters, this direct communication style, anti-establishment rhetoric, attacks on elites. I think that certainly has had an effect on how certain political leaders of far-right parties in Europe have responded to voters. So we can see that Trump is definitely having an effect on how far-right parties in Europe are catering or trying to. Appeal to voters, even if it might not be through direct policy.

Kaeden Thomas: Okay, let’s get a little bit more specific. So when the EU Parliament is designed to prevent the extremist parties from taking over from the far left to the far right. What will be the result of the far right sort of gaining traction within that setting, winning some elections within the EU Parliament?

Selene Campion: Yeah. So I I would say I would maybe push back a little bit on the characterization of Parliament as being constructed to counter extremist tendencies. I would say that the EU generally is an institution that emerged in various forms after World War II, and so in its earliest form, what it was there for was to maybe counter the rise of extremism and authoritarianism that we saw with Nazi Germany. So the basis of the EU or its original reason for existing is rooted in kind of this peaceful global order. Since then, I would say it has various institutions within them, and they may not be explicitly anti-extremist. And so, what I mean by that is the EU Parliament, for example, that is a directly elected body, which means that citizens in different EU countries choose who they want their European members of parliament to be, and so in that way, it is a reflection to some degree, much like national elections are, of voter preferences. So whether voter preferences are radical right, radical left, more mainstream, the EU Parliament is going to reflect this, and in fact it has. So far-right parties have gained significant traction in recent years in EU parliamentary elections. I wouldn’t say they have been able to necessarily move policy, so they have kind of created these groups among themselves, like the Patriots for Europe, the European Conservatives and Reformists. So they’ve created kind of alliances among themselves, and while they haven’t necessarily been able to reshape policy, they have been able to kind of set the agenda. So, what do our voters care about when you form a coalition of various radical right members of European Parliament, you can kind of aggregate these preferences. Like our voters think that the EU cares too much about climate politics, and as a result, we shouldn’t be spending so much time, money, and effort on thinking about ways to mitigate climate change, or our voters don’t want such free movement within EU borders. They’re anti-migration, so we should be more restrictionist in our migration policy. Whether or not they actually get those measures is another question, and so far, they haven’t been super successful, but they have been successful, kind of elevating these issues to the supranational level and making other more mainstream parties have to consider them in a way that maybe they wouldn’t have otherwise.

Kaeden Thomas: So rather than pushing sort of their direct policies, they’re influencing it.

Selene Campion: I would say so, and partly that’s just because they do not yet have a majority, or maybe not yet. Maybe they never will. The far-right parties are not a majority, so it works in the sense that it’s a democratic system. So if you’re in the governing majority, you’re able, more able to shape actual policy. Right now, they’re still in the minority, so they don’t have direct access to policymaking. The more mainstream groups, the center-right European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, they’re still the ones in control. They’re still the ones making policy, but these far-right coalition groups can still raise these issues, even if they know that they’re not necessarily going to get their way in policy.

Kaeden Thomas: And this question might be a bit more speculative, but. Do you think that this is just the natural pendulum swing of sort of political popularity, or are these far-right parties going to be here to stay? Is this is this surge sort of very temporal, or is that going to you know transverse through you know, into the future. If you can answer that.

Selene Campion: Yeah. You know, it’s funny. I always tell my students, like, as political scientists, we never speculate. So I feel like maybe I’m going against my own advice here. That being said, I guess it would depend on the length of time we’re looking at. So I mean, if we look across history and time and space, we can kind of see that there’s an ebb and flow in terms of movements to the right and to the left and towards authoritarianism and towards more of a neoliberal global order. So I think it would be reductionist to say that you know these parties are definitely here to stay, but I do think that there is some cyclical element to their rise. So voters, again, across time and space, we know that voters will often punish incumbents during periods of crisis, and whether or not you would consider the last decade or so to be a period of crisis might depend on your political or economic outlook. But that being said, there has been a lot of change in the last decade or so. So we have seen rising inequality. We did have the refugee crisis in 2015, and some might argue was still ongoing. We did have Brexit, so there certainly have been considerable changes for many EU citizens, and many EU citizens feel that the mainstream parties are not adequately addressing these issues, and so in that way, we can see it as maybe this is just a natural, to some degree, response that obviously not all voters are going to support or endorse, but we can understand maybe why some voters do. The other thing I’ll say, and the last thing I’ll say to this point is, I think it’s important to note as well that many of the parties that were considered to be quite radical right and extreme in the ’90s or early 2000s, such as the National Rally under its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen and then Marine Le Pen, have tried actively to make themselves appear more mainstream. So while in the past maybe they would have really embraced this anti-establishment radical right identity, they have been trying to kind of sell their voters on on a new image that portrays themselves as simply a reasonable response to all of these changes. So they themselves are kind of rebranding, and it will be interesting to see, I think, in the future whether or not there is increased buy-in from voters as these parties try to make themselves more mainstream.

Kaeden Thomas: A lot of these far-right parties are kind of anti-EU a little bit more isolationist, similar to Trump, right? Is it likely that we see more European states leaving the EU, such as you know the instance of that of Brexit? Is that going to happen again? I’m getting into the speculative side of things, but is it likely that is it likely to happen, or is that kind of is that something that’s maybe a little bit outlandish.

Selene Campion: I wouldn’t say it’s outlandish. I would say it’s again we’re speculating here. I would say as an observer, it seems unlikely that in the near future there will be a movement akin to Brexit, that could be for various reasons. I think one is that the UK has always had a kind of tense and maybe antagonistic relationship at times with the EU. So its decision to leave didn’t come out of nowhere. Under Margaret Thatcher, for example, she was quite anti-European integration. So the EU, excuse me, the UK, as a case is a bit unique. I also think that other European governments, as well as their citizens, have seen. How difficult and costly it was for the UK to leave the EU. That it wasn’t simply something that happened overnight and it was fixed, and that they got their autonomy back. But actually, there were quite significant political as well as economic costs. So I think that has kind of made both voters as well as radical right parties that might have embraced leaving the EU a little bit more cautious. I also think we want to consider what these countries are actually getting out of EU membership, and that is usually some type of financial assistance. So, for example, Hungary, which was very critical of its own involvement in the EU, never made the move to leave the EU, partly because it was receiving significant financial contributions. So there are ongoing incentives for countries to stay within the European Union framework, even when we see the rise of parties that have traditionally criticized it. So what we see now is more EU skepticism, but trying to maybe reform the EU, and this is what the national rally has been wanting to do with their representatives in European Parliament, trying to reform the EU from within rather than simply leave, simply exit.

Kaeden Thomas: Okay, and as we’re wrapping up here, I kind of wanted to touch on something that you had touched on a little bit earlier. Are we in a point of like complete sort of societal discontentment with politics, at least in Europe? And is is that sort of something that directly correlates to extremism, like we’re seeing now? Is that a fair assumption to kind of put two and two together?

Selene Campion: I would say that in Europe, and there is, of course, significant variation across countries. We are seeing, to a degree, what we see it in the United States as well, which is an increasing distrust, maybe in institutions and democratic institutions and how they govern. With the idea being that they are not living up to their promise of redistribution, for example, so they are not adequately equipped to solve issues such as growing economic inequality, and so this has led to a broader discontent, I think, among Europeans, not just the ones that are voting for the radical right, but I think among the population, especially among young Europeans, so we’re seeing in France, for example, right now mass protests against the education system. The idea that it’s not working properly, and that the institutions that set it up have not been responsive to what young people need and what voters want, so in that way we are seeing kind of a shift. Whether or not this leads to a massive increase in voting for the radical right, I think remains to be seen. But I think we can’t really argue with the fact that there is growing voter discontentment.

Kaeden Thomas: Okay, super interesting inflection point in European politics and largely global politics. I appreciate you coming on and explaining a bit of it to us today. Thank you, Celine Campion.

Selene Campion: Thank you so much.

 

Transcribed by otter.ai

k.thomas@dailyutahchronicle.com

@kaedenthomas.bsky.social

The post The Full Extent: The rise of the European far-right with Selen Campion appeared first on The Daily Utah Chronicle.

Read more here: https://dailyutahchronicle.com/2026/11/10/the-full-extent-the-rise-of-the-european-far-right-with-selen-campion/
Copyright 2026