On Feb. 23, North Korea and the United States will attempt to restart six-party talks to jumpstart the denuclearization of North Korea and the transfer of possible aid to the impoverished country. The United States must take a strong stance to force North Korea to begin the denuclearization process and to force compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency but must do so using a “stick and carrot” strategy in dealing with the relationship that China has with North Korea.

The United States currently has the option of denying aid to North Korea and imposing even harsher economic sanctions should the North Korean government not engage in compromise during the upcoming talks. By further damaging the already struggling North Korean economy through the removal of aid and threatening to impose harsher sanctions, the United States can incentivize progress as a means of avoiding the loss of aid.

The U.S. government’s current plans involving food aid provide a “carrot” approach to complement the “stick” of harsh sanctions. The North Korean people are currently suffering from the effects of economic failure, political repression and international isolation. If the North Korean government agrees to compromise on its nuclear program — a program that provides a certain status to the North Korean government but also imposes a heavy economic toll on a country with an already poor economic situation — the United States and the other four powers engaged in the talks should be willing to open up their diplomatic and economic connections to promote further negotiation.

However, no progress in the talks can be achieved without the help of China. China is North Korea’s main ally and continues to provide a massive amount of much-needed aid to the nation. However alluring more aid from the United States or Japan may be, the prospect of losing some of its aid from China is an even stronger call to action, or in this case, a call to compromise for North Korea. China faces as great a threat as both the United States and South Korea from this unstable and economically failing state on its border armed with the fourth largest army in the world and nuclear weapons. Therefore, China’s ability to convince North Korea of the benefit of compromise and of progress in the coming talks is more real than the ability of the United States to do the same. Although the United States and China disagree on many issues and share different values in the current international system, both countries share a common view about the danger of nuclear proliferation and the danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of “rogue” states. This commonly held perspective must be exploited to force North Korea to denuclearize and comply with international nuclear standards.

Finally, the United States must also take into consideration the probable weakness of Kim Jong-un. Although relatively little is known in the Western world about North Korean politics or the ascendency of Kim Jong-un, it is safe to suspect that, like in any transition of power between two dictators, there will be those that doubt the new leader’s ability to rule. Therefore, the United States must be careful to avoid over-pressuring North Korea to avoid the possibility that Kim Jong-un, in fear of losing control of the more conservative elements within his government, will withdraw from the talks to preserve his domestic authority. As such, the United States must take a firm stance to push North Korea to proceed toward denuclearization but must also allow Kim Jong-un to gain from the talks in some form to further legitimize his rule. The United States should not destabilize a nation that would pose a greater threat to world stability should it feel the need to take aggressive measures for domestic purposes.

In the coming talks, the United States must maintain a strong stance toward North Korea and use the threat of harsher economic sanctions as an incentive for the North’s cooperation. The instability and danger that a nuclear North Korea continues to pose requires a strong response from the United States, a response that cannot be achieved solely by employing American force but through the combined influence of regional powers.