When the United States invaded Afghanistan in October of 2001, I naively assumed the mission would be easy: American and allied troops would root out the bad guys, and the Afghan people could create a new country with neighbors flying kites, children attending school, and families planting flowers around their homes. Ten years later, Afghanistan stubbornly defies my predictions, and news reports remain mostly negative.

However, in early January, PBS released a documentary noting that farming families have indeed planted flowers—specifically, poppies.

The documentary “Opium Brides” tracks journalist Najibullah Quraishi interviewing families whose poppy crops have been destroyed by the Afghan government. Without crops to sell, the families find themselves indebted to drug traffickers who often demand farm children as repayment.

It’s painful to watch. The young, mostly female children range from five to fourteen years old. They sit passively as their parents describe their depressing future of servitude and forced marriage.

Although no reliable statistics on the number of debt children exist, the United Nations estimates Afghanistan produced 5,800 tons of opium in 2011—a 61 percent increase from 2010. This amounted to a $2.4 billion value—15 percent of Afghan GDP—and supplied 82 percent of global opium. Some sources estimate over 90 percent of heroin worldwide originates in Afghanistan.

Illicit drugs directly threaten Afghan security. Trafficking generates revenue for militant networks that siphon off protection money and levy taxes. These groups bribe officials to turn a blind eye, fostering corruption. This strengthens non-state actors like the Taliban at the legitimate government’s expense.

Unfortunately, few easy solutions remain. Simply destroying poppy harms farmers’ economic interests, leaving the population vulnerable to exploitation and poisoning public opinion against the United States. Although the Obama administration ended the policy of eradicating poppy crops in June 2009, leaders should try persuading the Afghan government to halt crop destruction as well.

Which policies might work? Underlying economic desperation can only be addressed through further investment. Current foreign aid to Afghanistan amounts to $80 per person, as compared to $275 per person given to Bosnia after its 1995 war. Development-focused policies that combat opium have shown success—for example, in 2009, British troops distributed wheat seed to 32 thousand farmers, and began creating irrigation infrastructure necessary for legal crops.

Opium remains a symptom of a state without adequate rule of law, stability, or alternatives. If the United States expects to leave any hope of stability when troops depart in 2014, leaders must recognize that the absence of insurgency does not ensure the creation of stability.

While many other challenges exist—corruption, extremist networks, and influential regional actors, to name a few—it seems unlikely that Afghanistan can achieve stability without addressing illicit drugs.

It’s entirely possible that in this time of fiscal belt-tightening economic development will be ignored, or prove insufficient to end drug trafficking’s stranglehold on Afghan society. Sustainable livelihoods for farming families won’t eliminate the Taliban, and some areas may continue illegal production.

However, investment in Afghanistan’s economic future may alleviate some challenges the country faces and prevent future atrocities—and a country on the brink of failure can’t afford to squander that chance.