In the midst of regional turmoil and overwhelming pressure for change, Morocco’s monarchy has seemed to be a model for the Arab world of preemptive and proactive government action to preserve stability. In the face of popular protests driven by the February 20^th youth movement, King Mohammed VI was able to defuse tensions rapidly and effectively. In his historic March 9^th speech, he called for reform, announcing a “comprehensive constitutional reform which is designed to upgrade and revamp state institutions.” Within months, a new Constitution had been written, presented, and passed with a reported 98.5% approval rating in a referendum as much on Morocco’s king and monarchy as on political changes. The institution of cosmetic constitutional reforms allowed for the defusing of popular tensions and the rebranding of the monarchy as reformist without making substantial changes to the current system. These dynamics between king and people in enacting reform all are illustrative of some of the fundamental challenges to genuine and lasting political change in the Middle East.

The stabilizing combination of the traditionally legitimacy of the monarchy, the personal charisma of the king, and a careful balancing act between concession and repression provide a template of stability at the cost of individual liberty. Mohammed VI has continued to command a certain amount of popular and traditional authority. Having succeeded his unpopular father, Hassan II, in 1999, he has always presented himself as a modernizer and reformer. Portraying himself as “king of the poor,” he has strongly condemned government corruption and economic inequality. In June 17th speech leading up to the July 1^st constitutional referendum, the King framed his objectives largely in terms of the crafting of more just and legitimate state, speaking of his commitment to constitutional reform as watershed event in “the construction of a State based on the rule of law and on democratic institutions.” However, the espousal of parliamentarian principles has yet to correlate with their execution, and the referendum itself seems to bely its intended ends. Considering that turnout in the most recent parliamentary election was a paltry 37%, the reported 72% turnout rate seems surprising, to say the least. Moreover, the question remains of whether the reforms, enacted in a top-down manner and without substantial popular involvement, make substantive changes to the status quo.

Among the world’s most enduring dictators, Mohammed VI still commands almost unchecked power. He is, by law and tradition, commander of the faithful and head of state, combining political, moral, and religious authority. While slightly limiting the previously unchecked power of this Leviathan, the unelected and unaccountable king remains dominant with regard to executive power. The king appointed a small group of government officials, with no representatives of the various opposition movements, to revise the constitution, which he claimed was “drawn up by Moroccans, for all Moroccans.” In thus “sticking to its authoritarian prerogatives,” Aboubakr Jamai, a prominent Moroccan journalist and 2007 Niemann Felow at Harvard, sees the monarchy as having made “the smart move” by “market[ing] the whole process as the benevolent king opposed by tiny, noisy, anarchical minority.”

Optimistically, one could argue that an ‘enlightened’ monarchy could, by gradually building the institutional basis and allowing civil society to strengthen, nurture the development of a more stable and sustainable democracy that would bring ‘greater good,’ politically and socially, to all Moroccans. The King could be considered the optimal political actor for the allowance of sustainable, peaceful, and lasting change. However, a distinction must be made between the façade presented by and external perceptions of the Moroccan regime and its reality, and a backsliding of freedom in Morocco since Mohammed VI has come to power is more representative. By the Freedom House’s rating of political rights and civil liberties, Morocco scores a five and a four respectively, on a scale of of one to seven.

Particularly in recent years, freedom of the press in Morocco has experienced a steady, downward trend and can, in brief, be considered not free. The Press Law allows for prison terms for nosy journalists, and government ownership of media– the monarchy has a major stake in Morocco’s main TV networks, giving it a high degree of control over domestic media. Particularly in recent years, freedom of the press in Morocco has experienced a steady, downward trend. When he was recently visiting Harvard for an event at the Ash Center, Moroccan journalist Aboubakr Jamai expressed his concern that the viability of the independent press is Morocco has been undercut by government’s use of both its economic muscle and various legislative strategies to force independent newspapers to shut down.  In 2000, his own Le Journal Hebdomadaire was banned after publishing an interview with Muhammad Abdelaziz, leader of the Polisario Front, a rebel movement for the independence of the Western Sahara, since the 1970s. The status of the Western Sahara falls among the topics–namely religion, the king, and the monarchy–that are, in practice, taboo. Today in Morocco, more so than in previous years, Jamai believes that “journalism means militancy–not being paid regularly or not being paid at all.” Especially in recent months, journalists and bloggers covering demonstrations have experienced intimidation and even physical violence from police.

As elsewhere in the Arab Spring, Facebook and other social media have provided a crucial means of organization and communication by creating a political space independent of government authority. Internet usage in Morocco jumped from 3.4% in 2003 to over 32.2% as of 2009, breaking the government’s monopoly on the dissemination of information. The ability to use online resources as a source of information and to publish online have allowed journalists to distance themselves from potential pressure.  While technology can’t necessarily be considered a causal factor, it does allow for complex and contentious dialogue that engages all aspects of society. Jamai believes that ultimately “democracy means risks, means freeing voices,” and, with the limited degree of freedom of expression permitted in Morocco, the internet may be the best way of doing so.

Although the implementation genuine reform and the institution of true democratic processes are possible–and could, perhaps,  be seen as inevitable–in Morocco, change will not come without upending the status quo and risking its stability and security. Morocco’s model of ‘soft’ autocracy and ‘benevolent’ monarchy do seem to contribute more tangibly and immediately to personal and societal good than an uncertain  for an undefined end. However, while the monarchical model may persist in the short term, it will certainly face further challenges to its legitimacy as popular pressure continues to mount. The February 20^thmovement continues to organize, and protests have been recently revived. As Jamai puts it, “Democracy is a constant struggle and we’re never done.”  Upcoming parliamentary elections in November, the first since 2007, will test politicians’ responsiveness to popular pressures and current levels of political engagement.