A cap-and-trade system seems to be the popular idea, currently. Not only in the political realm, but on the social front, as the media and political opponents have infamously dubbed it “cap-and-tax.”

Brilliant, at least as the immediate audience doesn’t even question where the tax term comes from. The term “tax” sticks out like a sore thumb, completely demeaning any progress the program may present.

But before disregarding the concept, one should see the simplicity of the cap-and-trade system as it, in theory, provides a legitimate climate control strategy for the future, though no government program is flawless.

In essence, cap-and-trade is self-explanatory. The government will set a cap on carbon emissions – a cap deemed reasonable and sufficient by the EPA – for the entire country. Through an auction-type system, carbon credits – each representing a specific amount of emissions – will be sold to companies nationwide.

For some companies a reduction in emissions will be difficult or at least costly and time consuming. Therefore, the system allows for smaller, less emission-intensive companies to trade away their credits to larger companies in exchange for profit.

It matters not if a couple companies hold all the credits and emit a greater proportion of the total, because there are only a set amount of credits within the market, so emissions will never exceed the set cap.

And if there is anything convenient about carbon emissions, it’s that the effects are global, not just local. Other than the inconvenience of living near the largest polluting plant in the country, geographical locations of the emissions are meaningless.

More importantly for our economy, the credit auction allows for the government to bring in additional revenue to be spent on government programs or – with a false hope – invested for future endeavors. In theory, this additional revenue should reduce the financial tax burden on the public.

Unfortunately, this auction system is rarely proposed alone. More often than not, the cap-and-trade system that is presented to Congress through the ever-redundant climate bill is an update, or amended form of the cap-and-trade idea.

This modified form often fails to concentrate on emission mitigation, which is the basis of the policy. Rather, it focuses on reducing the pressure of a new program on the larger, more carbon-dependent companies – for example, the companies with the greatest stake and influence in the economy.

This is where cap-and-trade hits the wall; this is how it fails.

This modified form could involve a “grandfather” option: The government can give away free credits to historically dependent polluters, such as a plant that is too old to adapt or one that has made commitments to implement emission standards in new plants for the future.

Sure, no problem, take your time “adapting.” It’s not like the emission issue brings a sense of urgency. I believe the lobbying can start right around here.

The new form could also incorporate a carbon offset program, allowing companies to basically “earn” credits by performing a carbon offset action, such as planting trees in the Amazon rainforest or investing in alternative energy technology – either domestic or international.

But how can you determine equivalents? Does one day of emissions equal out to 10 trees, or 100? And by implementing the system within the U.S., yet allowing international offset agreements, how are these offsets verifiable when they occur across the world?

NASA climate scientist James Hansen, one of the first to warn of the potential effects of climate change and a currently outspoken opponent of the cap-and-trade system, believes that the failure of the Copenhagen summit was a good thing, since the summit’s proposals planned to incorporate a cap-and-trade system with such offset programs.

Returning to the tree-planting example, Hansen quickly dismisses the legitimacy of an emission mitigation strategy with offsets: Planting trees within the forest doesn’t stop deforestation or decrease the demand of lumber. It only shifts the action elsewhere in the world. Offsets do not balance out excess carbon emissions; rather, they provide an excuse to emit more.

But what may be worst of all, no matter what form the cap-and-trade proposal takes, is the public will face the heaviest financial burden through the process.

For example, as presented by the Carbon Tax Center, let’s say a specific area in Oregon faces a hotter week than last. The utility companies will now be forced to use more coal to accommodate a larger demand in the air conditioning and electricity usage within that area.

Under the new system, this company will need to buy more credits to meet this increased demand, thereby bringing a rise in credit demand. In turn, the credit price will rise substantially.

Moving on down the chain, this increased price is going to be shifted to the lowest level: the consumer. So, yes, the semantic media opponents are somewhat correct with labeling the program “cap-and-tax.”

If it’s not obvious already, these are massive loopholes.

While it’s been well-known, and now explained, that cap-and-trade is financially taxing, it has always been assumed that the system will at least mitigate emissions.

But the “grandfather” option and the carbon offsets program completely undermine the fundamental goal of cap-and-trade: to decrease – or at least control – emissions. These alterations only raise the ever-important cap.

So, as with any other governmental policy, cap-and-trade has a great foundation: The program focuses upon the issue at hand while bringing in profit to the government. Essentially, the policy should better both the public and the government.

Unfortunately, like so many other aspects of government, cap-and-trade is obviously flawed; loopholes and exceptions debase the foundation of the policy.

There is only one way to go from cap-and-trade, and that’s up.

It’s difficult to find a policy that can meet emission targets, minimize the financial burden on the public and allow the government to find monetary and social value in the program. But this is not impossible: the answer is the carbon tax, or fee-and-dividend approach.

The fee-and-dividend concept is unheralded in political policy, under-reported in the media and ignored within the carbon-dependent economy – all for good reasons.

Good reasons for them, not you.

– Armand Resto is an Oregon State U. sophomore in environmental science.